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Abstract
Does the scope of beliefs that people can form on the basis of perception remain fixed,
or can it be amplified with learning? The answer to this question is important for our
understanding of why and when we ought to trust experts, and also for assessing the
plausibility of epistemic foundationalism. The empirical study of perceptual expert-
ise suggests that experts can indeed enrich their perceptual experiences through
learning. Yet this does not settle the epistemic status of their beliefs. One might
hold that the background knowledge of experts is the cause of their enriched percep-
tual experience – what is known as cognitive permeation – and so their subsequent
beliefs are only mediately justified because they are epistemically dependent on
this background knowledge. I argue against this view. Perceptual expertise is not
the result of cognitive permeation but is rather the result of perceptual learning,
and perceptual learning does not involve cognition in away that entails cognitive per-
meation. Perceptual expertise thus provides a means of widening the scope of the im-
mediately justified beliefs that experts can form.
1. Introduction
We rely on experts to guide us to the best restaurants and exhibits,
provide us with guidelines to separate the edible from the poisonous
plants, keep our populations safe from external military threats, and
run quality control on the tools and devices we use, amongst other
things. While not all expertise is perceptual, the study of what is
known in psychology as ‘perceptual expertise’ suggests that some of
it is. Perceptual expertise is the ability to categorize or recognize
objects reliably, automatically, and exceedingly rapidly. Almost all
of us are experts at recognizing faces, birds, dogs, and cars, and
some of us develop expertise in categorizing these objects at the ‘sub-
ordinate’ level, where these are more fine-grained subcategories such
as ‘Northern thrush,’ ‘Boston terrier,’ and ‘Lada’.
Perceptual experts are able to form beliefs on the basis of percep-
tion – henceforth, ‘post-perceptual beliefs’ – that novices cannot
form without testimony or inference. Suppose a birding novice is
out for a walk in the forest with his friend the expert ornithologist.
The ornithologist recognizes a bird in a tree and points it out –
‘there, a yellow warbler’, she exclaims. The novice looks and
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recognizes a yellow bird, but he would not be able to form the belief
that it is a yellow warbler without his friend’s assistance and expert
testimony. Likewise, a radiologist can readily point out tumours in
X-rays, whereas the novice must rely on the radiologist’s testimony
to form a belief that some shadowy patch is a tumour.
In order to advance our understanding of the nature of perceptual
expertise, it is crucial to understand both what the expert’s ability
consists in and the justificational structure of their beliefs. On one un-
derstanding of expert ability, a change in perceptual experience
between novice and expert is the source of the expert’s ability to
form beliefs such as that a bird is a yellow warbler, or that a shadow
in an image is a tumour. There are two ways of elaborating this view.
On the first, the change in perceptual experience between novice and
expert is entirely understood in terms of low-level properties, where
these are confined to the most basic building blocks needed to con-
struct perceptual experience, such as colours, illumination, shapes,
motion, and spatial properties (Tye 1995; Dretske 1981; Connolly
2019). On the second – sometimes labeled the rich content thesis –
the change between novice and expert is understood in terms of
high-level properties, where high-level properties are simply all
those properties that fall outside the category of low-level properties
(Siegel 2006; Siewert 1998). In our examples, the perceptual expert
represents the high-level property ‘yellow warbler’ or ‘tumour’ in
her perceptual experience, whereas the novice does not. In what
follows I assume the rich content thesis to be true and explore what
follows for the epistemology of expert post-perceptual belief.1
While we readily defer to perceptual experts, in order to make
sense of this deference we must get clear on the structure of their jus-
tification: does it differ in kind from that which justifies novice
beliefs, or does it merely differ in degree of reliability?
Perception is often thought to provide a distinctive source of justi-
fication for our beliefs, with some maintaining that post-perceptual
beliefs are basic, or immediately justified (Huemer 2001; Brewer
1999; Goldman 2008). A belief is immediately justified when it
does not depend on another belief for justification, but is nevertheless
1 I provide detailed argument elsewhere (Ransom 2020) for the claim
that perceptual experts can come to represent high-level properties in per-
ceptual experience via a process that I shall discuss below: perceptual learn-
ing. This is why I do not discuss the possibility here that expert knowledge is




justified (Alston 1983). Mediately justified beliefs are those that do
depend on one or more other beliefs for justification. In the case of
post-perceptual beliefs, the source of justification is not a further
belief, but rather our perceptual experience. Post-perceptual beliefs
are therefore plausibly immediately justified (though see Kvanvig
and Riggs 1992).
If the number and kinds of properties we represent in perceptual
experience are fixed, then so too is the scope of immediate perceptual
justification. However, if our perceptual experience can change and
growwith learning, then it seems that the scope of immediate percep-
tual justification can also change. Call this the wider scope thesis: the
scope of immediately justified perceptual beliefs can be enlarged or
broadened through learning. This change in scope would have par-
ticular significance for foundationalism, the view that there is a
class of immediately justified beliefs that justify all mediately justified
beliefs (for example Bonjour 1978). The truth of the wider scope
thesis would render foundationalism more plausible because an ex-
pandable base of immediately justified beliefs could in turn ground
more mediately justified beliefs. Beyond foundationalism, any view
that allows that perception provides us with immediately justified
beliefs should care whether the wider scope thesis is true. If it were
not true, then we would need to create and be mindful of a further
distinction between perceptual experiences that provide immediate
justification and those that do not.
At first glance, perceptual expertise supports the wider scope
thesis: perceptual experts come to have richer perceptual experiences,
and since perceptual experience is a source of immediate justification,
then their resulting beliefs are also immediately justified. In fact,
some foundationalists do appeal to learning as a way of increasing
the number of basic beliefs one has (Goldman 2008; Brewer 1999).
Likewise, rich content theorists tend to hold that many high-level
properties come to be represented in perception via some form of
learning (Macpherson 2012; Siegel 2010; 2006). While our percep-
tual systems may allow us to represent certain low-level properties
like colours and shapes without any learning – or even limited
high-level properties such as causation – the idea that the visual
system represents high-level properties like ‘yellow warbler’ from
the get go is less plausible. Some of us recognize these objects,
some of us do not, and learning explains the difference.
In both debates, however, the nature of the learning process must
be further specified so that the epistemic consequences can be better
understood. Understanding what sort of learning is at issue is par-
ticularly important because the wider scope thesis and the rich
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content thesis can come apart – we might represent high-level prop-
erties in perceptual experiencewithout its being the case that this pro-
vides a new source of immediate justification.
One way in which perceptual expertise may fail to vindicate the
wider scope thesis is if expert perceptual experience is the result of
cognitive permeation. This would render the justification of expert
post-perceptual beliefs mediate rather than immediate. In such
cases, ‘perceptual’ expertise would be a matter of acquiring the
right background theory, and our evaluation of expertise would
consist largely in evaluating the merits of the learned theory. If this
were true, then it would have profound implications for our under-
standing of perceptual expertise, under what conditions we ought
to trust perceptual experts, and how we design training programs in
disciplines frommedicine, to the military, to art criticism.While per-
ceptual experts would still have reliable post-perceptual beliefs, the
structure of their justification for such beliefs would be radically dif-
ferent from the post-perceptual beliefs one can form on the basis of
unlearned perceptual experience.
In what follows, I argue that perceptual expertise is not the result of
diachronic cognitive permeation but is rather the result of perceptual
learning, and perceptual learning does not involve cognition in a way
that entails cognitive permeation. Perceptual expertise thus provides
ameans of widening the scope of the immediately justified beliefs that
experts can form. This provides us with an added understanding of
why we ought to trust expert testimony in many domains: not only
is it based on perceptual experience, it is also epistemically independ-
ent of background theory. In section two I present the cognitive per-
meation thesis in more detail, and elaborate what I take to be the most
plausible hypothesis for how it might result in perceptual expertise.
This advances the debate by filling in the details of a process that
has remained largely underspecified in the literature. In section
three, I discuss the epistemic significance of cognitive permeation,
arguing that post-perceptual beliefs formed via permeated perceptual
experiences are only mediately – rather than immediately – justified.
In section four, I introduce an alternate conception of how perceptual
expertise is acquired: through perceptual learning. I then argue that
perceptual learning can accommodate cases of perceptual expertise
previously thought to involve cognitive permeation. This paper
thus also provides a challenge to defenders of cognitive permeation:
they must find cases of perceptual expertise that cannot be explained
away in terms of perceptual learning along the lines I have proposed.
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2. Perceptual expertise as cognitive permeation
Cognitive permeation – also commonly referred to as cognitive pene-
tration – is hypothesized to occur when the contents of perceptual ex-
perience are altered in some way by one’s cognitive states, such as
beliefs and desires (Pylyshyn 1999; Siegel 2012).2 Permeating
beliefs are sometimes called ‘background beliefs’. Susanna Siegel
offers the example of Jill, who has a background belief that Jack is
angry with her, and on this basis has the perceptual experience of
Jack’s face as angry.(2012) This experience in turn causes her to
form the post-perceptual belief that Jack is angry with her, or rein-
forces her existing belief.
The basic idea of cognitive permeation is easy enough to grasp.
Providing an adequate characterization of the phenomenon,
however, has proven more challenging (Stokes 2013; Zeimbekis and
Raftopoulos 2015, pp. 27–32). Nevertheless, there are common
strands amongst several definitions. First, there is a causal condition:
the background belief must be a cause of the resulting perceptual ex-
perience. Second, there is an internal condition: in order for cognitive
permeation to occur, the background belief must provide direct input
to perceptual processing, which then modulates perceptual experi-
ence. Third, there is a semantic coherence condition: the content of
the input provided by the background belief must bear a semantically
non-arbitrary relationship to the resulting content of the perceptual
experience. As Zenon Pylyshyn puts it, the influence of the cognitive
input on the contents of perception must be ‘coherent or quasi-ra-
tional when the meaning of the representation is taken into
account’ (Pylyshyn 1999, p. 365 n. 3). Together, these conditions
suffice for cognitive permeation, and rule out common cases of
benign cognitive influence on perception.3 For example, suppose
you have a belief that a friend is coming to the department to visit,
and so you attend to the open door of your office, expecting to see
her any minute. When your friend finally appears, your belief has
causally altered the contents of your perceptual experience by
2 Here I follow Becko Copenhaver (personal conversation) in using
‘cognitive permeation’ to avoid gendering reason as masculine.
3 While some theorists have rejected the semantic coherence condition
in order to make room for the permeation of experience by desires and
moods, the sort of cognitive permeation hypothesized to occur with expert-
ise must be explicable in terms of beliefs or concepts closely tied to the re-
sulting perceptual content, and so would meet the semantic coherence
condition.
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directing your attention to the door. This alteration is semantically
coherent because the content of the attention-guiding belief – that
your friend will appear in the doorway – is semantically connected
to the relevant content of your perceptual experience: your friend
standing in the doorway. However, the internal condition has not
been satisfied because cognition has provided only indirect input to
perceptual processing, through the reorientation of your attention.
For this reason, the case fails to count as cognitive permeation.
At first glance, the route to perceptual expertise seems quite differ-
ent from cognitive permeation – psychological studies have found
that the change in perceptual abilities from novice to expert requires
long periods of training involving many perceptual exemplars, not
the simple acquisition of background beliefs or knowledge
(Gauthier et al. 1998). No matter how firmly a novice might
believe based on the testimony of an expert that the bird pictured is
a yellow warbler, this does not alter her ability to recognize yellow
warblers in the short term – acquiring such knowledge is not suffi-
cient for perceptual expertise.
Nevertheless, some have argued that perceptual expertise should
count as a form of cognitive permeation – diachronic cognitive perme-
ation – where this signifies that the permeation of perception by cog-
nition happens over time, with cognition gradually reshaping the
structure of the perceptual system and only eventually leading to a
change in perceptual experience (Churchland 1979 ch. 2; Kuhn
1962 ch. V, X; Churchland 1988, p.179). This is unlike the case of
synchronic cognitive permeation described above, where Jill’s belief
that Jack is angry is able to permeate experience without delay.
Recent defenders of cognitive permeation have discussed cases of per-
ceptual expertise such as the radiologist’s ability to detect tumours,
the art connoisseur’s ability to recognize categories of artworks, and
the herpetologist’s ability to recognize copperhead snakes, assuming
these to be cases of diachronic cognitive permeation (Stokes 2014;
Siegel 2012; Stokes 2020; Lyons 2011).
If achieving perceptual expertise involves a form of cognitive per-
meation, then it must be the case that it is the learning of the relevant
theory, or some subset of these beliefs, that is responsible for altering
one’s perception (see also Fodor 1988, p. 195). Given that we are in-
terested here in high-level properties that correspond to categories,
the background beliefs will concern the nature of these categories.
Novices may begin by acquiring background beliefs roughly of the
form ‘objects of category C possess properties x, y, z’ where x, y, z
are low-level perceptual properties such as size, colour, and shape,
and C corresponds to a high-level property such as being a yellow
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warbler. These beliefs must then cause the change in perceptual ex-
perience over time. Again, as with synchronic cognitive permeation,
the content of the background beliefs must also bear a semantically
non-arbitrary relationship to the resulting content of the perceptual
experience.
The condition that there must be an internal connection between
the belief and the perceptual experience is more difficult to adapt
for the diachronic case. It is hard to see how the causal link
between perception and cognition could be direct and internal and
yet cognition only exert its influence on perceptual processing –
and perceptual experience – over time. That is, if perceptual experi-
ence is not synchronically cognitively permeable by the learned back-
ground beliefs then it remains to be explained how it could ever come
to be diachronically cognitively permeable. A gradual effect, if it is to
be internal, still requires a direct pathway for providing input.
One mechanism by which diachronic cognitive permeation may
occur involves appealing to attention. This proposal should be con-
fusing to readers at first. The discussion above rules out attention,
as it serves only as an indirect modulator of perceptual experience
and so violates the internal condition. Another reason for ruling it
out is on the basis of the semantic coherence condition because atten-
tion ostensibly determines only the input to perceptual experience
and not the resulting content (Pylyshyn 1999). In the example dis-
cussed above of awaiting your friend in your office, semantic coher-
ence happens to be satisfied. However this satisfaction is ‘lucky’ in
the sense that it would not still obtain in the case that another col-
league had appeared at the door instead. In such a case, one’s percep-
tual experience would be of this other colleague, not the visiting
friend. Nevertheless, several theorists have recently argued that
some varieties of attention should be understood as a source of cogni-
tive permeation (Mole 2015; Wu 2017; Stokes 2018).
Explaining how attentionmight allow for diachronic cognitive per-
meation requires making some more fine-grained distinctions
between different varieties of attentional phenomena (Carrasco
2011; Armstrong 2011). Our attention can be oriented on the basis
of spatial location, features, or objects. Spatial attention is attention
to a location, irrespective of what is there. Object and feature-based
attention are attention to objects or features, irrespective of their lo-
cation. Exogenous attention is a ‘capturing’ of our attention by
certain features, irrespective of our aims: we involuntarily turn to
look at sudden loud bangs and bright flashes. Endogenous attention
is driven by cognition, where this is usually understood in terms of
our goals and tasks: we attend only to people wearing red shirts in a
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crowd because we are looking for a friend wearing a red shirt.
Endogenous attention can also occur more automatically, though it
is still driven by what we have learned: we reorient our attention ef-
fortlessly on the basis of arrows or the finger of a friend pointing in
a given direction, where this reorientation can also conflict with our
current task. Overt attention occurs when there is an attentional
shift that involves a reorientation of one’s body, where this includes
eye movements. Covert attention occurs when there is a shift in atten-
tion without any such bodily change, such as when we tune out the
person we are conversing with in order to eavesdrop on the conversa-
tion at the table next to us. All of these distinctions are orthogonal to
one another. For example, endogenous attention may be covert or
overt, and to features or to spatial location.
The sort of attention ruled out from counting as cognitive perme-
ation in the example above is overt, endogenous, spatial attention. In
awaiting your friend in your office, you purposefully reorient your
head or your eyes to a spatial location in response to a belief and
desire to see your friend. However, covert, endogenous, feature, or
object-based attention is not so easy to rule out. This is because in
certain cases such attentional phenomena appear to satisfy the three
conditions that suffice for cognitive permeation. Endogenous atten-
tion allocated on the basis of features or objects will always satisfy
the semantic coherence condition: the feature or object that is
guiding one’s attention will also be the feature or object that one
comes to represent in perceptual experience. When such attention
is also covert, then the internal condition is also satisfied, as atten-
tional allocation cannot be explained by assigning attention the
mere orienting role of providing input to perceptual processing.
There is some empirical evidence that supports the claim that
covert feature or object-based attention can indeed bias perceptual
processing itself (Mole 2015).
These distinctions provide the detail needed to elaborate an
account of how diachronic cognitive permeation occurs – call this
the belief-driven hypothesis. First, the novice acquires the relevant
background beliefs: she learns via testimony or inference that a
given object possesses characteristic features x, y, z (‘robins have
red breasts, brown feathers, and a yellow ring on their beaks’).4
4 Some might object here that what the novice acquires is a concept
rather than a belief. The challenge for those who nevertheless endorse cog-
nitive permeation is then to articulate how theory or belief can lead to
concept acquisition in a way that does not appeal to the pattern-driven hy-
pothesis that I defend below.
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Second, on the basis of these learned background beliefs, the person
overtly and endogenously directs her attention to these characteristic
features one by one to make an identification. This is in part a
post-perceptual process, likely effortful at first, whereby the person
accumulates perceptual evidence for categorization. It is a process
somewhat akin to checking boxes on a list (‘Does the bird have a
yellow ring on its beak? Check’). Third, over time repeated attention
to these features causes the restructuring of the perceptual system: the
pattern of attentional tuning becomes automated and covert, no
longer requiring the deployment of endogenous or overt attention –
it directly privileges the grouping of these features and renders
them simultaneously salient, perhaps by biasing the competition
for perceptual processing resources (Desimone 1998). This automatic
perceptual grouping may even be said to correspond to the represen-
tation of high-level properties in perceptual experience – the relevant
low-level properties have been grouped in a way that reliably tracks
the relevant natural or artifactual kinds.5With this theory of how per-
ceptual expertise occurs, we may now turn to the epistemic status of
expert post-perceptual beliefs.
3. The epistemic significance of cognitive permeation
In some cases of cognitive permeation, the resulting perceptual ex-
perience seems to be unable to provide any justification at all to the
post-perceptual belief. Siegel’s case of Jill and Jack is arguably of
this variety: given that Jill’s perceptual experience of Jack’s anger is
caused entirely by her background belief that Jack is angry, it
seems illicit for the perceptual experience to provide any additional
justification for the post-perceptual belief that Jack is angry.
Siegel’s original analysis of why this is the case rests on the notion
of perceptual sensitivity to the incoming stimulus (2012, p. 4,
p. 12).6 In such cases, the relevant content of the incoming stimulus
– Jack’s actual facial expression – makes no difference at all to Jill’s
perceptual experience. Instead, her experience is entirely dependent
on her belief, in the sense that it – rather than the incoming perceptual
5 See also McGrath (2017) for discussion of how recognitional abilities
may be developed over time.
6 In her (2012) paper Siegel also provides an analysis in terms of epi-
stemic circularity, and she has since (Siegel 2017) provided an alternate ana-
lysis of hijacked experience in terms of poor inference. I adopt the sensitivity
analysis because it is particularly fitting for the case of perceptual learning.
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information – determines her perceptual experience. Her perceptual
experience would be of Jack as angry, regardless of the actual percep-
tual input (see also Lyons 2011, p.301). Siegel holds that due to this
insensitivity the resulting perceptual experience fails to provide any
independent justification at all for the ensuing belief. In this case,
while perceptual experience can come to have rich contents as a
result of learning, the scope of immediately justified post-perceptual
beliefs is not wider as a result.
However, this analysis is compatible with the possibility that there
are cases of cognitive permeation that do allow for some sensitivity to
the incoming stimulus – it is meant to explain why certain instances of
cognitive permeation are epistemically problematic, not to provide a
comprehensive diagnosis of all cases of cognitive permeation. Indeed,
Siegel and others assume that in some instances cognitive permeation
will be virtuous – such as the radiologist who can perceptually recog-
nize tumours, and the herpetologist who can identify copperheads
(Lyons 2011; Stokes 2020).
This assumption has received a limited defence. Jack Lyons (2011)
proposes that cognitively permeated perceptual experience is virtu-
ous when it increases reliability. Dustin Stokes emphasizes the super-
ior performance of perceptual experts in their domain of expertise,
arguing that it is an epistemic good because ‘the expert is moving
closer to an optimal cognitive stance on the world (or a part of it),
where she can better acquire behaviourally relevant category and
diagnostic information’ (2020, p.18).
We can recast a defence in terms of sensitivity. It is plausible that
the background beliefs of perceptual experts – understood as per
the belief-driven hypothesis – do help increase sensitivity to the in-
coming stimulus rather than decrease it. For example, suppose my
belief that dogs have tails, fur, and so on, diachronically permeates
my perceptual experience in order to allow me to identify something
as a dog. This belief may allowme to becomemore sensitive to certain
aspects of my experience, as I may preferentially attend to the
animal’s tail and fur, say. And of course it allows me to become sen-
sitive to the property of something’s being a dog. So long as the back-
ground belief does not cause me to perceptually categorize things as
dogs irrespective of whether they are dogs, then it would seem that
the belief is working in concert with perceptual experience rather
than ‘hijacking’ the experience or reducing my sensitivity to percep-
tual input. If perceptual expertise results from diachronic cognitive
permeation, it is plausible that perceptual experience still provides
justification for the resulting post-perceptual beliefs.
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Nevertheless, there remains a challenge to thewider scope thesis on
this view: perceptual experiences formed as the result of cognitive
permeation provide only mediate justification for the ensuing
beliefs.7 One reason for thinking this is because it may be reasonable
to endorse what I will call the dependence principle. Nicholas Silins
(2013, p.25) articulates it thusly:
When an experience has the content that p in part in virtue
of some belief one has, it gives one justification to believe that
p only in virtue of one’s having justification for the belief.
Silins motivates the dependence principle by providing the example
of Alexa, who forms an unjustified background belief that ‘things
with such and such a look are sheep dogs’, which then allows her to
represent the property ‘sheep dog’ in perceptual experience.8 He
appeals to the intuition that it would be illicit for Alexa to gain justi-
fication through her perceptual experience for the belief ‘that is a
sheep dog’ given that she was not justified in the background belief
that led to her experience in the first place. Those who share this in-
tuition should endorse the dependence principle to explain why
expert perceptual experience fails to result in an immediately justified
belief. If we allow that unjustified background beliefs prevent subse-
quent post-perceptual beliefs from being justified at all, then this
would seem to indicate that the background beliefs are playing a me-
diating role even in cases involving justified background beliefs.
Another consideration in favour of the dependence principle stems
from the semantic coherence condition for cognitive permeation,
which ensures that there is a non-arbitrary semantic relation
between the background belief and the contents of perceptual experi-
ence. Since the content of the background belief is connected in a
quasi-logical manner to the content of the perceptual experience,
rather than a brute causal relation, this renders it plausible to also at-
tribute a relationship of epistemic dependence; it is the content itself
that is doing the work of restructuring the perceptual system over
time. Those who want to resist the dependence claim bear the
7 For alternate ways of motivating the claim that learned perception
provides only mediate justification see (Vaassen 2016; M. McGrath 2017,
pp. 30–34). Though see Siegel (2017, pp. 47–50), who considers various
ways in which perceptual experiences may provide immediate justification
even if they are cognitively permeated.
8 For further discussion or endorsement of the dependence principle
see (McDowell 1982, p.478; Plantinga 1993, pp.99–101; Markie 2005,
p.350).
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burden of providing some positive reason to believe that etiology does
not matter in the case of perceptual expertise, or does not impact im-
mediate justification.
In summary, if it is true that expert perceptual experiences are the
result of cognitive permeation then this plausibly renders them only
mediately justified. Therefore, perceptual expertise does not vindi-
cate the wider scope thesis: experts do not broaden the scope of
their basic perceptual beliefs through learning. In the following
section I argue that perceptual expertise is not the result of diachronic
cognitive permeation. It is rather the result of perceptual learning,
which does not involve cognition in a way that entails cognitive
permeation.
4. Perceptual expertise and perceptual learning
In the discussion of expert perceptual experience, people have often
assumed cognitive permeation as the default option for explaining
how learning can alter the contents of perceptual experience
(Churchland 1988; Lyons 2011; Briscoe 2015; Macpherson 2012;
Brogaard and Chomanski 2015). It is a tempting option because de-
clarative learning – the learning of verbally conveyed facts – and
belief-formation so often occur before, or coincide with, a change
in perceptual experience, and so it seems natural to assume that the
change depends on these newly acquired beliefs.
However, this inferential leap is unwarranted. The direction of de-
pendence may well run the other way round: changes to perceptual
experience may themselves anchor and solidify the learning of new
beliefs. Moreover, these changes may depend on repeated exposure
to and practice with the perceptual stimuli, rather than declarative
learning. That is, what is known as perceptual learning may instead
be driving the changes in perceptual experience.
Perceptual learning has emerged as an alternate way of explaining
the sort of learning that takes place from novice to expert (Ransom
2020; Connolly 2019; Brogaard and Gatzia 2018; Chomanski and
Chudnoff 2018; Chudnoff 2018; Vaassen 2016). It is an enduring
functional change in the perceptual system that results in a long-
term change in the contents of our perceptual experience
(Goldstone 1998; Gibson and Gibson 1955). However, unlike cogni-
tive permeation, the cause of the change is practice with or repeated
exposure to a perceptual stimulus.While diachronic cognitive perme-
ation may also involve such practice and exposure, background belief
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is themain cause of the change. This is not so in the case of perceptual
learning, as I shall specify below.
There is considerable evidence that with practice our perceptual
experience can become more fine-grained and accurate in terms of
low-level properties (Ball and Sekuler 1982). However, perceptual
learning has also been implicated in the acquisition of the sorts of
high-level properties of interest here. While the psychological study
of perceptual expertise (understood as only expertise with subordin-
ate categories) has morphed into its own relatively independent sub-
field, much of the study of learned categorization more generally has
remained within the domain of perceptual learning (Goldstone,
Landy, and Brunel 2011).
Perceptual learning involves processes known as attentional
weighting and stimulus imprinting (Goldstone and Byrge 2015). In
attentional weighting, those features relevant to a given category are
weighted in attention more heavily over time, and those that are ir-
relevant are weighted less heavily. The weights – I argue elsewhere
(Ransom 2020) – should be understood as evidential weights,
where this means that their weighting corresponds to how diagnostic
a given feature is for category membership. For example, eyes and
face shape are highly diagnostic of category membership for barn
owls, whereas the legs, colour, and beak are diagnostic of category
membership for blue herons.
Stimulus imprinting involves grouping the different weighted
features together, as well as becoming sensitive to and encoding the
relations between these features when they are relevant for diagnosti-
city. For example, what matters to categorizing faces as faces is not
just the detection of eyes, a nose, or a mouth, but detecting these fea-
tures together, in a specific configuration. The end result is a network
of feature and feature-relation detectors that are grouped together and
allow for detection and categorization of the object in perception
without any input from cognition.
This picture will strike readers as being very similar to the
proposed explanation of diachronic cognitive permeation offered
earlier – the belief-driven hypothesis. However, it is one thing to
say that perceptual learning involves the attentional weighting of
features over time, and another to say that this amounts to cognitive
permeation. What is at issue is whether the process of attentional
weighting must be guided by cognition in a way that amounts to
cognitive permeation.
Against the belief-driven hypothesis I defend the pattern-driven
hypothesis: perceptual learning is driven by real patterns in the rele-
vant class of training stimuli, and it is the gradual learning and
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detection of these patterns that drives the restructuring of the percep-
tual system, rather than declarative learning. Background beliefs are
not necessary for perceptual learning to occur, and when cognition
is involved in learning, it does not count as cognitive permeation
because it fails to satisfy the semantic coherence condition.
Some initial support for thepattern-drivenhypothesis comes fromthe
large numbers of exemplars needed for perceptual learning to occur. In
the case of perceptual expertise, learning to categorize lab-manufactured
objects such as greebles – gremlin-like animals – into subordinate cat-
egories requires roughly nine hours of practice with exemplars, broken
into one-hour sessions spread out over two weeks (Gauthier and Tarr
1997). In well-studied domains of expertise such as chess, musical per-
formance, and classical composing, the time required to develop ‘full
blown’ expertise – where this outstrips perceptual expertise – is often
estimated to be roughly a decade (Hayes 1989).
This exposure to exemplars is not optional to developing perceptual
expertise. It counts in favour of the claim that the primary factor in
assigning attentional weights is not what background beliefs one
has, or one’s background theory, but rather what the statistical prop-
erties of the environment are; if a white stripe is important to categor-
izing something as a skunk, then given enough examples this feature
will be weighted more heavily. Though this provides some support
for the pattern-driven hypothesis over the belief-driven hypothesis,
it does not yet rule out possibility that beliefs play an essential role
in perceptual learning. The belief-driven hypothesis may also be
able to explain the gradual nature of the process – while background
beliefs can cause shifts to our attention immediately, the perceptual
system perhaps needs time to automate and synchronize the process
so that multiple features are selected simultaneously, requiring a
certain number of pairings between the features. We therefore
require further reasons to favour one hypothesis over the other.
On the belief-driven hypothesis, acquisition of the relevant
belief(s) is not a sufficient condition, but it is a necessary condition
for perceptual expertise to occur. If the belief is to be the cause of
the expertise, then it cannot be absent. In (most) such cases, the fol-
lowing counterfactual will be true:
If the subject had not learned the background belief(s) B but was
seeing and attending to the same distal stimuli, she would not
have an experience with content p.9




Attention here should be understood as spatial attention, rather than
the feature-based attention involved in perceptual learning. In the
latter case, we cannot hold attention fixed between novice and
expert in part because synchronous attention to the features relevant
for categorization is itself a component of perceptual expertise. In the
case of spatial attention we can hold attention fixed. Seeing a distal
stimuli here should be understood in terms of low-level properties
only, given that what is at issue is whether the expert can come to per-
ceive high-level properties. The counterfactual will not hold in all
cases because there may be a closely related set of background
beliefs B* that would also allow the subject to have an experience
with content p. Nevertheless, the counterfactual is useful because it
makes clear that if the attentional weighting involved in perceptual
expertise – posited by both the pattern-driven and the belief-driven
hypotheses – can occur without being driven by the relevant back-
ground belief(s) then it is not an instance of cognitive permeation.
Attentional weighting absent background belief can indeed occur.
Goldstone, Landy, and Brunel (2011) characterize this sort of process
as ‘blind flailing’: attentional weights to features are assigned ran-
domly, and those that allow the agent to make important or useful
discriminations are selected and made permanent. This process is
much like natural selection, where random variation plus a mechan-
ism of selection can lead to strategic adaptations, without anyone
having the intent of designing a creature with such an adaptation.
The process is ‘blind’ in that there is no initial background belief
on the part of the agent that guides attention.
This sort of process has been well studied in low-level perceptual
learning. Such learning can occur absent cognitive guidance, in the
sense that the learning occurs despite it’s being task-irrelevant –
and so is not guided by endogenous attention – or even when the
stimuli are not consciously perceived (Watanabe, Náñez, and Sasaki
2001). In both instances this rules out a role for endogenous attention.
In the first case, the subject is performing an unrelated and attention-
ally-demanding central task, and so is not attending to the stimuli
that are nevertheless learned. In the second case, the subject does
not consciously perceive the stimuli, and so is not plausibly able to
direct her attention to them. However, this phenomenon has been
less well studied for the perceptual learning involved in perceptual
expertise, as category learning is usually part of the assigned lab
task and so should guide our attention.
Nevertheless, there is some evidence that perceptual expertise can
be acquired despite its being irrelevant to a training task (Wong,
Folstein, and Gauthier 2011). In the study in question, subjects
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trained to perform an orientation detection task with a class of novel
objects called ‘ziggerins’ – where the subtle variation in the shape of
the individual ziggerins was irrelevant – were able to increase their
performance in a post-training test that measured shape discrimin-
ation performance. This is a common marker of perceptual expertise
with subordinate categories: the ability to make fine discriminations
between similarly shaped individuals of the same category. The sig-
nificant improvement of subjects in the post-test is therefore taken as
evidence for task-irrelevant perceptual expertise.
In addition, the sort of background belief that is posited by the
belief-driven hypothesis is not present in this case. Experimenters
did not provide any prior instruction to subjects as to which intrinsic
features of the ziggerins were relevant to distinguishing between
them, as only rotation was relevant to completing the task. So in
this case no background beliefs or endogenous attention to cat-
egory-distinguishing features are necessary for perceptual expertise
to develop. The causal condition for cognitive permeation is violated.
While one counterexample is sufficient to falsify the claim that
background beliefs are necessary for perceptual expertise to
develop, we may wonder how often blind flailing actually occurs in
practice. Much perceptual learning for expertise takes place with
some sort of cognitive guidance, or the adoption of a strategy on
the learner’s part. In light of this, then perhaps we ought to make dis-
tinctions between different types of perceptual expertise, and evalu-
ate the epistemic consequences separately, given their different
etiologies. Perhaps background belief is necessary for some varieties
of perceptual expertise.
Indeed, there are studies that suggest that cognitive guidance is re-
quired. For example, Stokes (2020) cites a study on perceptual ex-
pertise with birds as demonstrating that mere exposure to
perceptual stimuli is insufficient to produce perceptual expertise.
In the study, experimenters trained twenty-one bird novices who
performed an initial subordinate-level matching task prior to training
(Tanaka, Curran, and Sheinberg 2005). Ten subjects then received
training in categorizing owls at the subordinate level (‘Eastern
screech owl’) and wading birds at the basic level, where basic-level
categories are composed of several subordinate-level categories, and
so are less fine-grained and more inclusive (‘wading bird’). For the
group of eleven, the training was reversed; they learned to categorize
wading birds at the subordinate level (‘blue heron’) and owls at the
basic level (‘owl’). After this training period, the subjects performed
the same pre-training matching task, along with two new matching
tasks of the same kind as the first but with different images, either
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of novel instances of the same subordinate bird categories used in
training, or novel instances of new subordinate categories.
In these post-tests, both groups did better at categorizing birds into
the subordinate levels they had been trained in. However, what is of
interest is whether they did better at making subordinate-level cate-
gorizations for the category on which they did not receive subordin-
ate-level training, but which they were nevertheless exposed to
during training. Here, subjects did make some significant improve-
ment in the first post-test, though it was below the improvements
seen for those who received subordinate-level training. In the
second and third post-tests, there is no pre-training baseline to
compare the results to – only the results of the other group. In both
these post-tests, those untrained in the subordinate categories did
worse than those with training, though the difference between the
groups was smaller than in the case of the first pre-test.
In deciding whether or not this case counts against the pattern-
driven hypothesis, we must be careful to properly characterize the
nature of the cognitive influence. Not all guidance of perceptual
learning by cognition will count as cognitive permeation.
Goldstone, Landy, and Brunel (2011) call the strategic manipulation
of the perceptual learning process ‘myopic flailing’ to characterize a
process that is more efficient than random variation but that falls
short of cognitive permeation. They provide a list of ways in which
we can ‘hack’ or tune our perceptual systems to accelerate perceptual
learning. For example, we might put two images of an almost-identi-
cal viceroy and amonarch next to each other in order to compare them
and spot the differences. Or, in wine tasting we might move the wine
around our mouths to get a fuller and longer taste, and suck in some
air to enhance its olfactory profile.
Such strategies servemerely as catalysts – rather than cognitive per-
meation – ensuring that our perceptual equipment gets the right
input, or enough practice with the right exemplars. Catalysts serve
to speed a process that would have occurred anyways given enough
time and the right conditions, so in such cases the guiding beliefs
are not necessary for learning. It is not the case that if the subject
had not learned background belief(s) B then she would not have per-
ceptual experience with content p. In such cases, the subject would
still come to have perceptual experience with content p, albeit after
a longer time period.
That the guiding beliefs in this sort of myopic flailing do not count
as cognitive permeation can be seen by noting that they do not
observe the semantic coherence condition. We may adopt a given
strategy in the belief that it will be helpful in learning to perceptually
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distinguish a given category of objects without possessing a back-
ground belief that the category is distinguished in virtue of certain
characteristics, or even a belief as to which category is which. In
such cases, there is a semantically arbitrary relationship between
the belief and the resulting perceptual content. For example, I may
put a picture of a viceroy and monarch side by side to facilitate per-
ceptual learning without knowing in advancewhat the perceptual dif-
ference is between them, or which is the viceroy and which the
monarch – the training sets might be simply labeled ‘x’ and ‘y’. It
happens to be the case that they are distinguishable partly in virtue
of a black stripe that cuts the bottom of only the viceroy’s wings.
But using the same strategy I might have learned to distinguish
them in another way if they possessed different distinguishing
features.
The case of bird expertise discussed above may be explained in this
way. First, the results are suggestive of the catalyst interpretation.
While greater post-test gains were seen for the subordinate categories
that subjects had been trained in (subjects trained to distinguish
various wading birds were better at performing the same/different
task for various wading birds), there was nevertheless significant im-
provement for the subordinate categories that the subjects had only
received basic-level training for. Subjects trained to distinguish
various wading birds were better at performing the same/different
task for various owl species that they had been previously exposed
to during their training (Tanaka, Curran, and Sheinberg 2005,
pp.148–49). This improvement suggests that there is some level of
perceptual expertise that can be acquired with passive exposure, or
task-irrelevance. While the degree of expertise is comparatively
lower than that of those who received subordinate-level training, it
may nevertheless be the case that subjects would gain a higher
degree of perceptual expertise with more exposure. This interpret-
ation is also plausible with respect to the way people often form per-
ceptual expertise in real life. When I first moved to Vancouver, I was
not able to recognize Northern flickers (a kind of woodpecker) on
sight, but I soon learned to do so as they are abundant in my neigh-
bourhood. I was able to reliably recognize the bird long before I
looked up the name or read a description of their identifying
characteristics.
Second, the sort of training that was given to subjects does not
satisfy the semantic coherence condition. Subjects were not given ex-
plicit instruction on the defining or typical perceptual characteristics
of different basic-level or subordinate categories. Instead, they were
given mere semantic labels, and feedback in terms of correct or
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incorrect semantic labeling during the training process. Subjects had
to learn on their own, in the face of the many exemplars of birds,
which features were relevant for categorization.
Here one might be tempted to characterize the relevant back-
ground belief along the lines of ‘that is a blue heron’ and so claim
that it does meet the requirement. After all, it is a belief that is virtu-
ally identical to the resulting content of perceptual experience.
However, the belief concerns a mere semantic label. The person
might have learned ‘that is a blue-footed booby’ instead, and still
come to develop a perceptual category for blue herons on this basis.
No content concerning the relevant perceptual characteristics of
blue herons is conveyed in the belief involving the semantic label
(except of course in this case that the heron is blue – though really
it is more grey than blue).
Amore difficult case for the pattern-driven hypothesis is that of X-
ray technicians, where passive exposure does not seem to result in any
perceptual expertise (Stokes 2020). They are held in contrast with
radiologists, who are physicians trained to interpret medical
images. Radiological expertise is often thought to be partly percep-
tual in nature, due to the speed and accuracy with which radiologists
are able to make diagnoses from a single glance (Bilalic et al. 2016).
Unlike radiologists, X-ray technicians are not physicians and are
not typically trained in how to diagnose medical images. Instead,
their training consists in how to properly use the machines in order
to get reliable images. They therefore plausibly lack the background
beliefs that would provide attentional guidance posited by the belief-
driven hypothesis in order to form the perceptual category ‘tumour’
or ‘nodule’, amongst other diagnostic categories. If they indeed lack
perceptual expertisewith these categories after a long period of expos-
ure to images that contain them, then it looks like vindication that at
least some forms of perceptual expertise require cognitive
permeation.
A recent study provides some support for this (Manning et al.
2006). The experimenters did not find a statistically significant
difference between the performance of eight novices at detecting
pulmonary nodules and that of five experienced X-ray technicians
without training in chest image interpretation. This is in comparison
to the superior performance of the same five X-ray technicians after
completing six months of training in chest image interpretation,
whose accuracy was then on par with the performance of eight experi-
enced radiologists.
However, cases such as these can be accommodated with a fuller
understanding of the role of goal-directedness in perceptual learning.
19
Expert Knowledge by Perception
Just as with the indeterminacy of translation there aremany candidate
interpretations of a foreign phrase or word, so too with perceptual
learning there are many candidate patterns available for learning in
a given set of images. In image sets as complex as X-rays, there are
many features that remain invariant across the set. When we select
one pattern for learning – perhaps through myopic flailing – this
may be at the expense of another pattern because we may not be
able to synchronously direct our attention to all features relevant to
both patterns. So when myopic flailing is initiated or guided by the
goal or the desire of the novice to improve in detecting a certain
pattern, this may diminish or eliminate her ability to learn another
pattern.
In the case of radiologists and X-ray technicians, it is likely that
their divergent goals have led them to focus on developing perceptual
expertise with different categories by selecting different patterns.
Whereas the goal of radiologists is to detect and diagnose potential ab-
normalities such as lesions and tumours, the goal of X-ray technicians
is to make sure the X-rays are good quality medical images.
Considerable training is required in order to discern whether an
image is of good quality. While there is no exact list of characteristics
for what makes a quality image, the image properties X-ray techni-
cians are attuned to include image sharpness, density (degree of
blackening on the film), and contrast (difference in density between
two adjacent structures) (Easton 2009). So X-ray technicians are
likely perceptual experts with respect to whether a given X-ray is of
good quality, though no studies have been done to test for such per-
ceptual expertise. If it is the case that X-ray technicians do have such
perceptual expertise, then it would go towards explaining their lack of
expertise with respect to tumours and other abnormalities – during
their exposure to images over the course of their work, they are
tuned to different patterns.10
Finally, themost difficult cases of perceptual learning to accommo-
date without cognitive permeation will be those where instruction
does take the form of providing an explicitly articulated rule along
the lines of ‘category C is characterized by perceptual features x, y,
10 A further source of support for understanding human expertise with
radiological images as perceptual may be found in machine learning, where
neural networks are becoming increasingly adept at categorizing images as
containing benign ormalignant tumours only on the basis of having received
training with labeled images (Shen et al. 2019). While this might be proof of
concept, a full discussion of this line of support would take us far afield of the
main task here, as there are several challenges to this line of argument.
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z’. However, in such cases while the semantic coherence condition is
satisfied, it is only luckily so.While in normal conditions semantic co-
herence is a good way of determining that the causal condition is
satisfied, in these cases, I argue that there is only lucky semantic coher-
ence: the background belief and the perceptual experience are seman-
tically coherent only because the belief happens to be true. This lucky
coincidence of belief and perceptual experience does not establish that
it is the belief that is doing the causal work of reshaping experience.
To illustrate, our previous counterfactual analysis will not help us
here. Instead, we need to consider what would happen in cases where
the background beliefs are false. For example, suppose I erroneously
believe that the difference between viceroys and monarchs is the spe-
cific shade of orange – monarchs are dark orange, and viceroys are
slightly lighter. This background belief causes me to spend a lot of
time focusing on attending to the colour of these two categories of
butterflies. In fact, colour is not a reliable way of telling the two
apart. In the absence of any actual studies of perceptual expertise
and false background beliefs, there are three distinct hypothetical
scenarios to consider.
The first is that I come to develop perceptual expertise, and am able
to rapidly, automatically, and reliably identify and distinguish
between viceroys and monarchs. This does not support the belief-
driven hypothesis, but is rather consistent with the pattern-driven
hypothesis. It is implausible to causally attribute my ability to the
background belief in this case. My perceptual expertise is achieved
in spite of, rather than due to, the background belief. Rather, what
is likely happening is that with enough exposure to reliable training
sets of monarchs and viceroys I am able to begin to be able to pick
out and attentionally weight the characteristics that are actually dis-
tinctive of these two categories. That is, I engage in perceptual learn-
ing. In this scenario, the semantic content of the false background
belief and the perceptual experience are not coherent, and if they
do become so it is in virtue of the acquired perceptual expertise
driving a change in belief. This is one sense in which the semantic co-
herence condition may be ‘luckily’ satisfied.
Moreover, given that the background belief is causally inert in
bringing about perceptual expertise in cases where it is false, we
can reasonably conclude that it is also causally inert in cases where
the belief is true.11 It indicates that perceptual learning privileges
11 One might object here that if the background belief does slow down
perceptual learning in the case where it is false, then we should think that it
likewise has an effect in cases where it is true (thanks to Rob Goldstone for
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the statistical properties of the environment over whatever back-
ground beliefs the novice holds. And if the statistical properties of
the environment are doing the work in cases where the background
belief is false, then we should also hold that they are doing the
work in cases where the background belief happens to be true. This
is another sense in which the semantic coherence condition is
‘lucky’: it is in virtue of the truth of the belief in the good cases,
rather than the causal efficacy of the belief in altering perceptual ex-
perience, that semantic coherence is obtained.
In the second hypothetical scenario, I do not develop perceptual ex-
pertise as a result of my training with monarch and viceroy images.
My performance is by chance when given an unlabeled image, assum-
ing there is an equal probability of viewing an image of either category.
This is not accompanied by any change in perceptual experience. I do
not represent the butterfly as a monarch or a viceroy. Instead, I have
the phenomenology of guessing. Again, this case does not support
the belief-driven hypothesis. Much like the first scenario, the belief
is inert in driving perceptual expertise, and so suggests that it is not
the belief that is doing the work in the cases where the background
belief and perceptual experience happen to cohere.
The final hypothetical scenario to consider is one in which I do not
develop perceptual expertise, but where my perceptual experience
does change. While I am distinguishing between monarchs and vice-
roys by chance, I do come to represent these properties in perceptual
experience, arbitrarily representing one or the other property. This
case would support cognitive permeation, in that it would reveal
that background beliefs, even when false, could alter the contents
of perceptual experience. In these cases, the semantic coherence con-
dition would be robustly satisfied, in that the content of the belief
would semantically cohere with the perceptual experience whether
true or false. This in turn would support the claim that the causal
condition is satisfied.
Notice, however, that this scenario does not support the belief-
driven hypothesis, which I have taken in this paper to be the most
plausible account of how diachronic cognitive permeation can lead
to perceptual expertise. On this hypothesis, the background belief
guides overt, spatial, endogenous attention to features one takes to
raising this point). I think this is right, but consistent with denying that the
effect is due to its semantic content. It may instead be understood in terms of




be relevant to diagnosis, and this repeated attentional guidance even-
tually leads to the restructuring of the perceptual system such that the
relevant features are picked out together. This perceptual grouping is
then thought to correspond to the representation of the high-level
properties in perceptual experience. However, in this case the prop-
erties one attends to in order to identify a monarch and those one
attends to in order to identify a viceroy will be identical, given that
we are supposing one is at chance in identification. This suggests
that, contrary to our initial description of the scenario, one does
not in fact represent the high-level property ‘monarch’ or ‘viceroy’
in perceptual experience, but something more akin to a conjunction
of both categories, and then arbitrarily attaches one or the other se-
mantic label. In order to make it the case that background belief, re-
gardless of falsity, can alter perceptual experience such that we
represent ‘viceroy’ or ‘monarch’ in perceptual experience, we must
adopt the synchronic view of cognitive permeation. This diverges
from the diachronic process of cognitive permeation that is hypothe-
sized to result in perceptual expertise, and so does not provide
support for this account.
In summary, whereas at first glance the examples of perceptual ex-
pertise I have discussed above seem to support the belief-driven hy-
pothesis (cognitive permeation), they can be accommodated by the
pattern-driven hypothesis (perceptual learning). The route by which
the contents of perceptual experience become enriched thus seems to
involve an increased sensitivity to the environment. This is as James
and Eleanor Gibson characterized perceptual learning. As a result of
perceptual learning, perception ‘is progressively in greater correspond-
ence with stimulation, not less’ (Gibson andGibson 1955).Moreover,
background beliefs are not required for this enhanced sensitivity to
occur. The main take-away point from the discussion is this: just
because a learning process involves cognition does not mean that it
counts as cognitive permeation. A challenge also now faces proponents
of diachronic cognitive permeation. While there may be other cases of
perceptual expertise that do support the belief-driven hypothesis, the
burden on those who favour cognitive permeation is to provide such
examples, and convincingly argue they cannot be accommodated by
perceptual learning in the manner I have outlined.
5. Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that perceptual expertise supports the
wider scope thesis. On the wider scope thesis the class of immediately
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justified perceptual beliefs can be enlarged or broadened through
learning. Perceptual expertise involves an enrichment of the contents
of perceptual experience, and so appears to support the wider scope
thesis. However, if this enrichment occurs via cognitive permeation,
then – as I have argued here – the post-perceptual beliefs of experts
are only mediately justified because such beliefs are epistemically de-
pendent on the permeating background beliefs. In addition, while
several theorists have suggested diachronic cognitive permeation as
the means by which perceptual expertise is achieved, this suggestion
has remained underspecified. I have thus provided a detailed account,
in terms of covert, feature-based, endogenous attention – what I call
the belief-driven hypothesis – that fills in the gaps.
However, I have argued against the belief-driven hypothesis, de-
fending instead the pattern-driven hypothesis: the change from
novice to expert should be understood in terms of perceptual learn-
ing, where this does not involve the permeation of background
beliefs. I have considered three cases of the acquisition of perceptual
expertise, two actual and one hypothetical, arguing in each case that
background beliefs are not essential to the learning process, and that
when they are involved they play a role that falls short of cognitive
permeation, first because they do not fulfill the semantic coherence
condition, and second because they are only ‘luckily’ semantically co-
herent, failing to fulfill the causal condition. A defence of the pattern-
driven hypothesis thus furthers our understanding of the nature of
the acquisition of perceptual expertise.12
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